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TOWARDS A CANADIAN POLICY FOR
PATENTING DISEASE GENES

S.

JoDI GALLAGHERI

ABSTRACT

Thousands of human genes, many associated with human disease
processes and diagnosis, have been patented in Canada. The scope of
these patents has restricted public access to genetic testing and raised
the question of whether human genetic material should be subject to
differential treatment by our patent law regime. The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) has failed to offer guidelines on the application of patent laws to genetic material, symptomatic of the broader
problem of a lack of strong federal leadership in this area.
In this paper I will engage the debate over patenting of human genes
specifically as it relates to disease gene patents and will critically
discuss various proposals for reform. For the purpose of my discussion I
have assumed that access to genetic testing (specifically for breast
cancer susceptibility) is desirable, that restricting access to testing is not
ethically justifiable and that commodification of human genes can be
harmful. Re-establishing an appropriate balance between private and
public interests in biotechnology requires patent reform. In arguing for
patent reform, I will focus on Myriad Genetics, a company that holds
patent rights to breast cancer susceptibility genes [discussed infi'a] and
is attempting to establish a worldwide monopoly on breast cancer
susceptibility testing. Myriad's claims have begun to stir a debate in the
public over the application of patent law to the human genome and the
potential harms of pen11itting commercial monopolies over genetic
testing services.

I S. Jodi Gallagher is a Dalhousie Law Student.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Thousands of human genes, many associated with human disease
processes and diagnosis, have been patented in Canada. The scope of
these patents has restricted public access to genetic testing and raised the
question of whether human genetic material should be subject to differential treatment by our patent law regime. The Canadian Intellectual
Property Office (CIPO) has failed to offer guidelines on the application
of patent laws to genetic material, symptomatic of the broader problem
of a lack of strong federal leadership in this area.
In this paper I will engage the debate over patenting of human genes
specifically as it relates to disease gene patents and will critically discuss
various proposals for reform. For the purpose of my discussion I have
assumed that access to genetic testing (specifically for breast cancer
susceptibility) is desirable, that restricting access to testing is not ethically justifiable and that commodification of human genes can be harmful. Re-establishing an appropriate balance between private and public
interests in biotechnology requires patent reform. In arguing for patent
reform, I will focus on Myriad Genetics, a company that holds patent
rights to breast cancer susceptibility genes [discussed
and is
attempting to establish a worldwide monopoly on breast cancer susceptibility testing. Myriad's claims have begun to stir a debate in the public
over the application of patent law to the human genome and the potential
harms of permitting commercial monopolies over genetic testing services.
Paiis II and III of this paper present background information to
genetic disease and the application of Canada's Patent Act, infra to
human genes. Part IV outlines the problem presented by companies such
as Myriad who wish to explore the outer limits of their patent rights. Part
V will examine the current state of patent law in Canada and conclude
that the law currently exists in favor of Myriad's claims, leaving the
question of whether change is waITanted. Part VI addresses the theoretical and practical implications of permitting patenting of human diseaseassociated genes and engages arguments in favor of and against the
status quo principle of broad patentability. After concluding that patent
reform is necessary to strike a better balance between legitimate private
and public interests, Paii VII presents a number of policy options
available to decision-makers while an international consensus is given
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time to develop. Part VIII concludes that further study and debate is
necessary in the Canadian context. Two of the most appealing policy
options are the implementation of a fonnal patent opposition procedure
and a compulsory licencing scheme for human disease-associated genes.

II. UNDERSTANDING GENETICS &

DISEASE

1. The Genetic Revolution

In the past fifty years we have witnessed a revolution in science that
has spread to many unexpected areas of our existence. Since Watson and
Crick first characterized the structure of DNA 1 , over 50 years ago, the
romantic allure of genetics as the holy grail of medicine has been almost
overwhelming. When the worldwide Human Genome Project was
launched in the 1980s, with the goal of mapping, or sequencing the
entire human genome, it was widely touted as promising a panacea of
medical breakthroughs. A more sober view is emerging.
While knowing the sequence of the human genome is an impressive
accomplishment, it is only a first step in a long process of scientific
discovery and learning. Decoding the bare sequence of the human
genome is much like having thousands of pages of text in another
language without knowing where the punctuation fits, what paris are
important or even how to translate the unfamiliar characters into an
understandable form. Most of the human genome is junk-DNA (the
unimportant paris of the foreign language text mentioned above) - noncoding sequences that normally get edited out when proteins, the building blocks of cells, are made.
In humans, DNA is organized into superstructures known as chromosomes. On each chromosome are thousands of DNA sections of
particular interest. Each of these packets of DNA is known as a gene. In
their natural form, genes are a raw product of nature and are not
patentable. 2 A geneticist who sequences a gene is not "inventing" the
1
DNA is deoxyribonucleic acid, the form in which genetic information is stored in cells of
living things. For a layperson's review of the basic science of DNA, genes and inheritance see
I. Rosenfield et al., DNA For Beginners (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983).
2 In the American case of Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed.
Cir. 1991 ), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 856 (1991) [hereinafter "Amgen"], a researcher had purified
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gene, since it exists in nature and was in a sense simply awaiting
discovery. It is not the natural fonn of a gene that can be the subject of a
patent claim, but rather the isolated, purified form of a gene that has been
the object of considerable human intervention. Multiple manipulations
are required to clone, amplify and sequence a very small portion of the
genetic code that is of interest - the single gene.
2. Genetic Mutation and Genetic Disease
Purely genetic disorders are rare. 3 Disease is more often related to
complex interactions between genetics and lifestyle, accumulated exposure to toxins, environmental factors or infectious disease. Purely genetic disorders are those where a change in the DNA sequence for a
specific gene (or genes) leads to a dysfunctional gene product being
made by the body, which in turn causes a disorder or condition. Clinical
examples include Tay Sachs syndrome, Canavan disease, spinal muscular atrophy and cystic fibrosis. 4 The genetic laws of inheritance determine whether children of specific parents, who are affected or who are
carriers, will develop the genetic condition in question.
While some gene mutations are known to cause disease, abnormalities in specific genes can be associated with increased risk for developing disease. Predictive genetic testing is designed to identify individuals
with disease-associated genetic abnonnalities before they develop any
disease-related symptoms. Genes such as BRCAl and BRCA2, for
example, are associated with inherited susceptibility to breast cancer.
Approximately 5-10% of all cases of breast cancer are thought to be
genetically-linked. While the general female population's lifetime risk
for developing breast cancer is approximately 10%, those with specific
mutations in genes known as BRCAl and BRCA2 (for breast cancer
genes 1 and 2), have approximately an 80% lifetime risk of developing

and isolated the DNA sequence for Erythropoietin, a protein useful in fighting anemia. The
researcher had not "invented" the gene in question, per se, since it existed in nature. It was
valid to patent novel, purified and isolated gene sequences derived from the original object in
nature.
3
See e.g. J. Wynbrandt & M.D. Ludman, The Encyclopedia of Genetic Disorders and Birth
Defects, 2"" ed. (New York: Facts on File, 2000).
4
See J.F. Merz, "Disease Gene Patents: Overcoming Unethical Constraints on Clinical
Laboratoty Medicine" (1999) 45: Clin. Chem. 324.
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breast cancer. 5 An inherited predisposition, also called a susceptibility,
to breast cancer can be detected by genetic testing for abnormalities in
BRCAl/2.
While the chances of a woman in the general population having the
relevant mutations in the BRCAI/2 genes is very low, access to genetic
testing for breast cancer susceptibility is a key issue for women with
familial histories of breast cancer. Those who discover they have inherited the BRCAI/2 mutations may consider preventative measures such
as increased breast monitoring, chemotherapy, drug treatment or double
mastectomy. 6 Information gained from breast cancer susceptibility testing offers women with worrisome familial history of cancer options in
the management of their own health care.
3. Disease Gene Patents
Discovering the sequence of a particular gene and the role of a
gene's protein product in the human body is the beginning of what can
be a long road of application-directed research. Commercial products
and services relating to genetic research can include diagnostic tests,
drug development or gene-based therapies. In the eyes of private or even
public institutions, patenting disease-related genes, as opposed to genes
not directly related to disease processes, could offer the attraction of
control over later, more profitable stages ofresearch. 7
Before the gene patenting gold rush of the mid- l 990s, a rich literature had begun to develop relating to the ethics of patenting human
genetic material. 8 What was merely an ethical debate has now become a
matter of reality. Thousands of gene patents have been issued around the

5
Reviewed in B.A. Koenig et al., "Genetic Testing for BRCA I and BRCA2: Recommendations of the Stanford Program in Genomics, Ethics and Society" (1998) 7:5 J. Women's Health
531 [hereinafter "Stanford Program Report"].
6
Stanford Program Report, ibid. at 534.
7
Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, Patents in Genes (Background Paper) by E
Richard Gold (Ottawa: CBAC, 2000) at I, online: <http://cbac-cccb.ca> (date accessed: 20
October 200 I) [hereinafter "Patents in Genes"].
8
See e.g. B. Looney, "Should Genes be Patented? The Gene Patenting Controversy: Legal,
Ethical, and Policy Foundations of an International Agreement" (1994) 26 L. & Pol'y Int'l
Bus. 231 [hereinafter "Looney"]; R. Macklin, "The Ethics of Gene Patenting" in A. Thompson
& R. Chadwick, eds., Genetic l'1formation Acquisition, Access and Control (New York:
Kluwer Academic/ Plenum Publishing, 1999) [hereinafter "Macklin"].
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world. 9 In the United States, more than 1000 human genes have been
patented with a further 10,000-20,000 human gene patents pending
approval. 10

III. UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF CANADIAN PATENT LAW
A patent is a form of intellectual property that grants an inventor a
limited monopoly over the practical application of a new idea. For a
specified period of time, currently 20 years in Canada, a patent holder
can exclude all others in the country from making, using or selling the
invention without pennission. The inventor must, in their patent application, make full disclosure of the patented innovation. 11
The federal Patent Act12 governs the procedure for acquiring a
patent, the requirements an invention must fulfill to qualify for patent
protection and the rights granted to a patent holder. The Canadian Patent
Office operates as part of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office
(CIPO), a branch oflndustry Canada that administers laws in relation to
copyright, trademarks and patents. 13 Patent officers, under the authority
of the Commissioner of Patents, are responsible for reviewing applications and granting patents on innovations that qualify for protection
under the Act.
A mere discovery of something that exists in nature (which is not
patentable) is legally distinguishable from inventions, which are patentable. Determining whether an innovation is a patentable invention is a
two-step inquiry. First, the innovation must be patentable subject matter.
Patents in Genes, supra note 7 at 3.
N. Thompson, "Gene Blues: ls the Patent Office Prepared to Deal with the Genomic
Revolution?" (200 I) Washington Monthly, on line: <http://biotech-info.net/gene _blues.html>
(last modified 4/9/01) [hereinafter "Gene Blues"].
11
For a general review of patent law in Canada, see such sources as Canadian Biotechnology
Advisory Committee, A BrielHist01y of the Canadian Patent System (Background Paper) by
V. Duy (Ottawa: CBAC, 2001 ), on line: Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee <http:/
/cbac-cccb.ca>( date accessed: 20 October 200 l) [hereinafter "Brief History"]; R.G. Howell,
L. Vincent & M.D. Manson, Intellectual Property Lmv: Cases and Materials (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery Publications, 1999) [hereinafter "Intellectual Property Law"].
12
R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 [hereinafter the "Patent Act"].
13
See <http://www.strategis.ic.gc.ca> for comprehensive information regarding patent application procedure and patent policy in Canada.

9

10
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Scientific principles, abstract theorems, mathematical fonnulas, and
methods of medical treatment including surgical procedures have been
held not to be patentable. 14 Second, it must be an "invention" within the
meaning of the Act.
The definition of "invention", which has remained virtually unchanged since Confederation, 15 is found in section 2 of the Act and states
that an invention is
any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art, process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter. 16

Three statutory requirements have been distilled from this definition. To be patentable, an innovation must be novel, non-obvious and
have utility. Canadian patent law shares these basic requirements with
patent regimes in many other countries. 17
Gene-based innovations are measured against the same patentability
criteria as subject matter in other areas of innovation. Critics have
suggested, apart from philosophical arguments that human genes are not
an appropriate subject matter of property rights, that genes may not meet
the technical requirements of novelty, inventiveness and utility.
1. Novelty

To be novel, the innovation must not be in the public domain
anywhere in the world 18 or be previously patented. The novelty requirement ensures that technology or products already in the public domain
cannot be removed and monopolized by a single paiiy. While genes
themselves are not newly created, the knowledge of a gene's sequence,
function and method of its purification may be new. Some gene patent
applications may fail on the grounds that knowledge of the gene se14
Patent Act, supra note 12 at s.27(8) [scientific principles, abstract theorems]; Tennessee
Eastman v. Commissioner ofPatents (1972), 8 C.P.R. (2d) 202 (S.C.C.) at 206 - 7 [methods of
medical treatment including surgical procedures].
15 Intellectual Property Law, supra note 11 at 932.
16 Patent Act, supra note 12, s. 2.
17
See for e.g. 35 U.S.C. x 100-12 (1988).
18
In Canada, a one-year grace period exists pursuant to s. 28.2(1 )(a) of the Act whereby
inventors may publicly disclose their innovation and still qualify for a valid patent if the
application in filed within one year of the disclosure. In some patent systems, absolute novelty
is required such that any public disclosure of the innovation in advance of a patent application
would defeat the statutory novelty requirement.
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quence already existed in the public domain, but this is not a broad
principled-based objection to disease susceptibility gene patenting.
Given the fast-paced growth of knowledge in this area, perhaps novelty
will become a significant hurdle to the patentability of human genes if
the novelty requirement is interpreted differently, but currently this
requirement offers little resistance to widespread gene patenting.
2. Non-Obviousness

Only inventive subject matter can be patented. If the innovation
would be obvious to an "unimaginative skilled technician" 19 in the
relevant field of invention, it is unpatentable. Arguably, the isolated
form of a gene meets this criterion. The value in isolating a particular
DNA sequence from the vast amounts of DNA in a cell and the sequence
itself are not obvious, even if DNA sequencing techniques are now
standard. It is not the natural form of a gene that is patentable. The
isolated and purified fonn of a gene, which does not occur in nature, is
patentable provided the other statutory requirements are met. In the
U.S., genes are viewed as complex chemical compounds that are patentable as a 'composition of matter'. 20 Just as the purified form of a natural
substance like the antibiotic penicillin are patentable, it is argued, so
should genes be viewed as inventive and therefore worthy of patent
protection. 21 On this logic, it has been argued, "in chemistry, the elements would have been patented."22 It is difficult to construct a counterargument against this claim. Somehow, significant human intervention
is seen to remove an innovation from the natural realm and make it an
appropriate subject of patent protection.
3. Utility

The key criteria to meet when filing a gene patent is utility. Merely
sequencing a gene offers insufficient information to warrant patent
protection. CIPO requires that an innovation must have an actual, ulti19

The currently accepted test for obviousness was fashioned by the Federal Court of Appeal in
Beecham Canada Ltd. et al. v. Proctor & Gamble Co. (1982), 61 C.P.R. (2d) I at 27.
20
A.R. Williamson, "Gene Patents: Socially Acceptable Monopolies or an Unnecessary
Hindrance to Research?" (200 I) 17 Trends in Gen. 670.
21
N.H. Carey, "Why Genes Can be Patented" (1996) 379 Nature 484.
22
S. Sexton, "No patent, no cure?" ( 1997 /8) 31 Health Matters, online: <http://
www.healthmatters.org.uk/stories/sexton31.html> (date accessed 8 November 200 I).
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mate utility in the traditional commercial sense in order to be patentable. 23 General usefulness in basic research or treatment is insufficient.
For a gene patent application to meet the utility criterion, the gene
product must be known and have a useful function. Researchers cannot
patent genes of unknown function or utility, hoping to later determine
their importance to disease or research.
4. Scope of Patent Protection
Under current law, if a genetic sequence is isolated and is shown to
be novel and have a function that is useful, that gene is patentable as a
composition of matter derived from nature. Beyond the fundamental
debate concerning whether human genes are properly the subject of
patents, an additional issue of contention is the scope of protection that
such a patent confers on its holder. Simply put, if BRCAI and 2, the
breast cancer susceptibility genes are patented, what does that mean for
the holder of the patent and others members of the community? The
defensible scope of patent protection is of critical importance in relation
to disease gene patents. The scope of patent rights can impact the
accessibility of genetic testing to the general public.
One part of any patent application is the "claim", which defines the
scope of the monopoly the applicant asserts is covered by the patent. 24
Once the patent application is reviewed and approved, the claim defines
the scope of the proprietary interest the patent holder possesses. In
exchange for full disclosure of the details of an invention, a patent
holder is granted a 20-year term to exclusively make, construct, use, sell
or import the invention. 25 In the case of gene patents, claims are being
made for the right to exclude others from any method of using that DNA
composition, including all diagnostic applications. Myriad, for example,
has been granted a patent on the BRCA genes. In describing the utility of
the BRCA genes, Myriad explained their testing for susceptibility to
breast cancer and claimed a proprietary interest in all diagnostic and
therapeutic applications of the BRCA genes. Myriad claims that patenting a gene to be used for genetic testing gives them rights over all testing

l11tellectual Property Law, supra note 11 at ehapter 21; Pate11ts in Ge11es, supra note 7 at 5-9.
Ibid.
25 Pate11t Act, supra note 12 at s. 42.

23

24
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of that specific gene. By stating their patent application claims broadly,
Myriad has been granted patent rights in more than just their testing
methodology.
As illustrated by examples in the U.S., biotechnology companies
have already begun to aggressively monopolize the testing service market. Duke University holds the patent on the human Apo-E gene, which
is linked to late-onset Alzheimer's disease. Duke exclusively licensed
its patent to Athena Diagnostics, a company who in 1999 demanded that
all tests for Alzheimer's be routed through its own labs. Similarly, the
Miami Children's Hospital, after patenting the gene linked to Canavan
disease, attempted to enforce its patent by stopping other labs from
conducting genetic testing on potential Canavan carriers. 26
Many authors have accepted the view that gene patent holders can
legitimately claim a monopoly over all therapeutic and diagnostic applications resulting from knowledge of their patented gene. 27 This idea of
the broad scope of a gene patent stems from traditional patent law
principles relating to the market protection afforded inventors. When the
subject of a patent is a distilled version of a naturally-occurring item,
however, the relevant question becomes whether the patent protection
extends to all uses of the nah1ral fonn of the item as well. It seems the
distinction between patenting the natural form of a gene and the isolated,
purified form of a gene is illusory if the scope of patent protection is as
broad as that claimed by patent holders such as Myriad Genetics, Athena
Diagnostics and the Miami Children's Hospital. I will address in a later
section whether such broad patent rights are in the public's interest and
if not, whether government regulation is warranted.

IV. UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGE OF
MYRIAD GENETICS INC.

Myriad Genetics Inc. ["Myriad"] is well on its way to acquiring a
global monopoly on testing for breast cancer susceptibility. By May of
2001, the company held more than seventeen patents in Europe, the

26

27

Gene Blues, supra note IO; Disease Gene Patents, supra note 4.
See e.g. Disease Gene Patents, supra note 4; Gene Blues, supra note I 0.
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United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand covering the breast
cancer susceptibility genes BRCAl and 2 and its BRACAnalysisa testing method. 28 Myriad's gene patents claim a monopoly over all diagnostic and therapeutic applications of the BRCA 1 and 2 gene sequences.
While Myriad was filing and processing patent applications on
genes and testing methods during the 1990's, both the public and private
sectors were forced to respond to increasing demand for genetic testing
for breast cancer susceptibility. Consequently, health authorities in the
United Kingdom, France, Germany and various provinces in Canada
developed their own genetic tests for BRCAI and 2 mutations. Ontario,
for example, began offering clinical BRCAI and 2 testing in April 2000
through seven Regional Genetic Testing Centers. 29 During the year
2000, approximately 1000 BRCA screening tests were conducted in
Ontario at a cost of $800-$1200 per test. 30 British Columbia, Quebec
and Alberta have also been conducting BRCA screening tests in provincial laboratories. Once Myriad's patents were finally granted in
Canada,31 the company took aggressive steps to enforce the legal rights
granted by CIPO.
In May of 2001, Myriad sent a cease-and-desist letter to all provincial governments notifying them of the company's patents on the BRCA
genes and that provincial programs testing for those genes constituted a
patent violation. The letter demanded that all tests for breast cancer be
routed through Myriad's Canadian licensee MDS Laboratories 32 or
directly to Myriad's worldwide testing center in Utah. Myriad's screening costs $3850 per test. 33

See www.myriad.com. The four Canadian patents are numbers 2,196,790, 2, 196,795,
2,196,797 and 2,239,733.
29
From 1995-2000 BRCA testing was available in Ontario as part of clinical research projects.
3°C. Malian, "Gene Tests for Cancer Won't Stop
Harris Pledges Help with Battle over U.S.
Patent'', Toronto Star (September 20, 200 I).
31
Myriad's Canadian patent on BRCAl was finalized in October 2000 while the BRCA2
patent was issued April 2001: see www.strategis.ic.gc.ca.
32
In March of 2000, Myriad exclusively licensed MDS Laboratories of Toronto to market
BRACAnalysisa in Canada. Myriad Genetics, Press Release "Myriad Genetics Launches
Molecular Diagnostic Testing in Canada" (3 September 2000), online: <http://
www.myriad.com/pr/20000309.html>
33
L. Hurst, "U.S. Finn Calls Halt to Cancer Test in Canada: Utah Patent-Holder Claims
Exclusive Right to Diagnose Breast Cancer Gene" Toronto Star (12 August 2001 ), online:
<http://www.bcexperience.com/chat.htm> [hereinafter "Star article"].

28
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Myriad's aggressive steps to exercise its exclusive rights to perform
diagnostic testing on the BRCA genes reignited a debate in the media
and political circles over human gene patenting and the scope of patent
protection in the public health arena. In July 2001, in response to
Myriad's warning, British Columbia's Ministry of Health abandoned its
three-year old testing program amid protests that the public could not
afford private testing services. Ontario has taken a different tactic.
1. Ontario's Response to Myriad

In the face of Myriad' s threat of patent infringement litigation, the
Ontario government decided to continue funding the testing program at
its provincial Regional Genetic Testing Centers. The province's position is that:
services now provided by the Ontario hospitals do not constitute
infringement of any valid claim of Myriad's patent. The question of
whether isolated genes should be patentable is still a matter of international debate. 34

In recent speeches before the Ontario Advisory Committee on New
Predictive Genetic Technologies, both Ontario Premier Mike Harris 35
and the Minister of Health & Long-Term Care Tony Clement36 stated
vehemently that Ontario would continue its testing program. Reaffirming the Ontario government's position, the message to Myriad was clear
- claiming a monopoly over all diagnostics related to the BRCA genes is
not legitimate, and human genes should not be patented anyway.
Harris and Clement's objections raised two broad arguments against
Myriad' s viewpoint. First, granting exclusive monopolies over genetic
testing would collapse our public health care system and make testing
inaccessible to all but those who can afford to pay exorbitant private
Government of Ontario, News Backgrounder, "Gene Patenting and Predictive Genetic
Testing" ( 19 September 200 I), online: <http://www.premier.gov.on.ca/english/news/
GeneTest09 l 90 l _bd l .htm> (last updated: I October 200 I).
35 Government of Ontario, "Premier's Speeches: Predictive Genetic Technology" (19 September 200 I), online: <http://www.premier.gov.on.ca/english/speeches/Genetic09 l 90 l .htm>
(last updated: I October 200 I) [hereinafter "Harris Speech"].
36 Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Speech Transcript, "Speech Re: Myriad
Gene Patent Issue" (19 September 200 I), on line: <http://www.gov.on.ca/health/english/news/
speech/sp_091901 _ tc.html> (last updated: 19 September 200 I) [hereinafter "Clement
Speech"].
34
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testing fees. Since this result is unacceptable, the scope of gene patents
must not be as broad as that claimed by Myriad, meaning that Ontario
hospitals are not infringing any valid claim by Myriad in continuing
their testing programs.
Secondly, a more fundamental argument was advanced that human
genes are discoveries and not patentable inventions. Since the human
genetic heritage belongs to everyone, the benefits of genetic research
must not be concentrated in the hands of a select few companies or
individuals. While the biotechnology industry may have a legitimate
commercial interest in recouping costs and making a reasonable profit,
these interests must be balanced against the public interest in having
meaningful access to predictive genetic testing. I will further assess
these arguments in Part VI of this paper, where I discuss whether patent
reform is needed.
2. The Ontario Context: Webster
It is tempting to hypothesize that the Harris government took such a
strong stand against Myriad, in part, because of a woman named Fiona
Webster, an Ontario woman with a strong family history of breast
cancer. Webster's physician had recommended she undergo prophylactic double mastectomy as a preventative treatment. Webster wanted to
be tested for the BRCA mutations before undergoing the surgery so that
she could make a fully informed decision, 37 but faced a two-year waiting
list for access to research-based BRCA testing programs in Ontario.
OHIP would pay $20,000 for the mastectomy procedure but refused to
cover the $3600 cost for out-of-province genetic testing. 38 A private
donor paid the $3600 price tag for Webster to be tested by Myriad. The
test was negative - Webster had not inherited the BRCA mutations that
would put her at extremely high risk for breast cancer. She declined
prophylactic surgery.
Webster fought for reimbursement of the cost of BRCA testing. In a
precedent setting case before the Ontario Health Services Appeal and

37

Recall that if a woman tests negative for the relevant BRCA mutations, her lifetime risk of
breast cancer is approximately I 0%, while women with BRCA mutations have a 70-85%
lifetime risk of developing breast cancer: Stanford Program Report, supra note 5.
38
C. Abraham, "Defying Cancer Fiona's Choice: A Matter of Principle" The Globe and Mail
(17 July 1998) A2.
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Review Board in 1999, Webster was prepared to argue that BRCA gene
testing for women with a strong history of breast cancer was a "medically necessary" service, meaning that the Ontario Health Insurance
Plan (OHIP) would be compelled to cover its cost. 39 The case settled on
consent, with the Health Ministry recognizing that BRCA gene testing
was no longer experimental and that Webster's testing was an essential
medical service for which OHIP was obliged to pay. 40
The lesson from the Webster case seems clear. In Ontario, BRCA
genetic testing for women with a strong family history of breast cancer is
a medically necessaiy service that OHIP must fund. Testing for BRCA
mutations in Ontario hospitals at $800-1200 per test is far cheaper than
Myriad's $3850 price tag for BRACAnalysisa testing. If 1000 high-risk
women qualify for testing each year, the difference would be upwards of
$3 million dollars to the provincial health care budget. 41
In the context of a constrained health care budget, an awakening
debate over the ethics of human gene patenting, little federal leadership
relating to biotechnology patents, a growing European backlash against
Myriad's BRCA patents, and the Webster case, Premier Harris' government made a savvy move. They gambled that a bold response to
Myriad's demands would garner public support and precipitate action
by the federal government in this arena. After all, Myriad's expensive
test is not the only one on the horizon. The health care system is being
faced with potential monopoly pricing of a whole new category of
diagnostics relating to human genetic research. As stated by Dr. Philip
Wyatt, director of the genetic testing program at North York General
Hospital:
Here is a corporation saying, 'We own this material, here are the rules,
here are the costs.' There are hundreds of these patents coming. It's

39

B. Price, "London Woman a 'Hero' for Ruling in Cancer Case" The London Free Press (28
August 1999) A3; C. Abraham, "Tenacious Woman Scores Medical Victory: Fiona Webster's
Fight Opens Access to Genetic Breast-Cancer Test." Globe and Mail (27 August 1999) Al.
40
Hart v. The General Manager. Ontario Health Insurance Plan, Health Services Appeal and
Review Board, file S.6136, 16 July 1999 (unreported).
41
Approximately 1000 women underwent BRCA testing in 2000. If the difference in cost to
medicare between Myriad's test ($3850) and in-province testing ($800) is $3000 per test,
testing 1000 women per year would mean a difference in cost of approximately $3 million
dollars. If interest and awareness of breast cancer susceptibility testing creates a greater
demand in future, the difference in cost could be even more staggering.

102 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

breast cancer today, prostate cancer and heart disease tomorrow. If
they're all handled like this, it is the end of publicly funded health
care. 42

Since Myriad's Canadian patents on the BRCA genes run until 2015
and the company seems intent on protecting its intellectual property, this
is not an issue that will disappear on its own. A resolution to the Myriad
challenge will set the stage for subsequent battles with other biotech
giants over human gene patents.

3. Federal Leadership Needed
As Ontario Premier Harris has noted, in the arena of biotechnology
and gene patenting, there has been a "troubling lack of action"43 on the
part of the federal government. In 1993, the Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies recommended banning commercial genetic
testing in Canada. 44 If this recommendation had been legislated,
Myriad's exclusive Canadian licensee MDS Laboratories would be
unable to perform testing, but the underlying questions relating to the
breadth of patent law in relation to human genes or the legal scope of
gene patent claims would have been left unresolved.
There is no policy framework at the federal level to deal with these
issues and many groups are calling for a reexamination of Canadian
patent law in light of the potential impact of gene patenting on the health
care system. The issues and impact of human gene patenting are far
broader than any single provincial jurisdiction and are constitutionally
within the competence of the federal government to address. Some
progress appears to be on the horizon.
In 1999, the federal government appointed the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (CBAC), "an expe1i, arn1's-length committee
created under the renewed Canadian Biotechnology Strategy (CBS) to
advise Ministers, raise public awareness and engage Canadians in an
open and transparent dialogue on biotechnology matters." 45 The CBAC

42

Star article, supra note 33.
Harris Speech, supra note 35.
44
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies "Ch. 24: Commercial Interests and
New Reproductive Technologies", Proceed with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission
on New Reproductive Tech11ologies 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Government Services Canada,
1993) 695.
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special project steering committee examining the "Protection and Exploitation of Biotechnological Intellectual Property (Including the Patenting of Higher Life Forms)" recently released an interim report which
proposes a number of amendments to the Patent Act in light of current
and emerging biotechnology issues. 46 The CBAC project is still in the
public consultation stage and is not scheduled to submit a final report
until April 2002. 47 However, it is not clear whether recommending
sweeping reform is within the mandate of the CBAC Steering Committee or that considering the consequences of human disease-associated
gene patenting is foremost on their agenda. More comprehensive federal
analysis and reform in the area of gene patenting and regulation of
genetic testing is required.

v. UNDERSTANDING WHY GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION IS NECESSARY

To warrant government intervention, Myriad's monopoly over
BRCA diagnostics must be contrary to the public interest. Arguments on
this issue generally fall into two forms - deontological, which address
the intrinsic rightness or wrongness of patenting human disease genes
and consequentialist arguments that assess the consequences of the
status quo approach to human gene patenting. 48 It is not my goal to
present the entire debate over whether human genes should be patented,
but to engage the key arguments of specific relevance to disease gene
patents such as those held by Myriad on BRCA l and 2.
45

Industry Canada, News Release, "20 Members Appointed to Canadian Biotechnology
Advisory Committee" (27 September 1999), online: <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/
bh00249e.html> (date accessed: 8 November 200 I).
46
Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, Biotechnology and Intellectual Property:
Patenting of Higher Life Forms and Related Issues: Interim Report to the Government of
Canada Biotechnology Ministerial Coordinating Committee (Ottawa: CBAC, 2001) [hereinafter "CBAC Interim Report"].
47
CBAC Interim Report, ibid. at 25.
48
For a further discussion of deontological versus consequentialist arguments, see: CBAC,
Patenting of Higher Life Forms and Human Biological Materials: An Introduction to the
Issues (Background Paper) by T. Schrecker & A. Wellington (Ottawa: CBAC, 2000), online:
Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee <http://cbac-cccb.ca> (date accessed: 20 October 2001) [hereinafter "Patenting o.f Higher Life Forms"].
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1. The Ethics of Patent Law
The ethical and financial consequences of broad patent protection
for human disease genes are currently not a consideration for those
granting or refusing patents in Canada. According to Industry Canada,
who is responsible for patent policy, the financial impact of human
disease gene patents on Medicare has nothing to do with the Patent Act4 9
and is an issue for Health Canada. 50 The United States Patent and
Trademark Office has espoused a similar view, that their office exists to
call "balls and strikes" on patent applications. Taking into account the
potential effect of gene patenting on the accessibility of testing services
"would be way outside the purview of the agency." 51 Some would claim
this hands-off approach is appropriate. Patent law, they argue, operates
for economic ends and is "entirely unsuited to arbitrate on moral and
ethical questions." 52 Further, commentator C. M. Ho has opined:
A patent system is not a means of safeguarding the public interest. It is
primarily a commercial and industrial tool that encourages innovation,
divorced from social and ethical concerns.

Furthermore, since the Patent Act53 makes no explicit reference to
ethics, it is argued, it would be inappropriate to reinterpret the neutral
requirements of the Act as erecting ethical boundaries.
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully debate
whether patent law legitimately incorporates ethical considerations. In
constructing patent law as a social contract between an inventor and
the government on behalf of society, I have implied it is appropriate to
take into account broader social interests. Ethical analysis seems embedded in the normative elements of patent law. Judgements about
whether an innovation has utility, for example, can be a subjective
determination of what our society considers useful. 54 Our patent law
sets up a legal regime whose purpose is not only to create economic
incentives and wealth, but to stimulate the overall level of invention in
49

Supra note 12.

°Comment by Susan Binocoletto of Industry Canada quoted in D. Bueckert, "Feds Dismiss

5

Ontario's Gene Patenting Concerns" Canadian Press (21 September 2001), online: <http://
www.canoe.ca/HealthO 109/21 _ cancer-cp.html> (date accessed: 8 November 200 I).
51 Quoting Stephen Kunin, PTO Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy in Gene
Blues, supra note I 0.
52 G. Poste, "The Case for Genomic Patenting" ( 1995), 378 Nature 534.
53 Supra note 12.
54
Looney, supra note 8 at 251.
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society. We must not ignore the ethical implications of our chosen
patent law scheme.

2. The Status Quo Supports Myriad's Claims
If federal leadership fails to materialize in relation to patenting
human disease genes, legal battles such as that between Ontario and
Myriad may continue to arise as patents are granted and enforced in
other clinically relevant areas. Companies such as Myriad argue they
have a right to recoup research and development costs and to exploit
their patents to the fullest extent allowed by law. If Myriad were to bring
a patent infringement suit against Ontario's Health Ministry, it would be
futile for Ontario to argue that human genes are not patentable material.
The courts have stated clearly that patent law is to be interpreted
broadly. In August 2000, the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal
held that a genetically-modified mouse (the "Harvard oncomouse") was
patentable subject matter and that:
the provisions of the Patent Act have been cast in broad terms to fulfill
Parliament's objective - to promote invention. If anyone is of the
opinion that the scope ofpatentability should be narrowed, it is open to
that person to ask Parliament to do so.ss

The Court could easily offer the same reply to Ontario's argument
that human genes are not patentable under the Act. In addition, the
Supreme Court of Canada has strongly stated that patent rights are broad
in scope. Lamer J. (as he then was) for the Supreme Comi of Canada in
Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd. v. Conunissioner of Patents 56 stated that the
granting of a patent in Canada permits an inventor "exclusive right to
exploit his invention for a period in exchange for complete disclosure to
the public of the invention." 57 Based on these decisions, Myriad's
lawyers most likely feel quite confident that without legislative or
regulatory reform, the Canadian courts would enforce broad subject
matter patentability and a broad scope of exclusive rights to patent
holders.

55

President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2000] 4
F.C. 528 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 474 [hereinafter the
"Harvard oncomouse" case].
56 (1989), 25 C.P.R. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.).
57
Ibid. at 265.
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3. Interpretations of the Public Interest Can Vary
Human gene patents need not necessarily result in testing monopolies and outrageous prices. When researchers at the University of Michigan patented the gene associated with cystic fibrosis, a common lethal
genetic disease, they prohibited exclusive licensing agreements and
charged only $2 per test. 58 Arguably, Myriad's testing is more labour
intensive and high-tech than cystic fibrosis testing, but the contrast in
philosophy about profiting from gene discoveries is startling. Francis
Collins, one of the University of Michigan researchers who patented the
cystic fibrosis gene, felt strongly that human genes are a common
heritage that should not be patented. 59 While philanthropic gene patent
holders will hopefully always exist, it would be nai've to assume that
society can trust all patent holders to act primarily in the public interest.
In press releases and interviews, Myriad officials have attempted to
justify their aggressive patent enforcement measures as being in the
public interest. Myriad spokesperson Bill Hockett claims that Ontario
women who are not using their lab's sophisticated technology could be
getting false results, thereby putting their health at risk. Myriad's President Dr. Gregory Critchfield has stated that
if you let everybody do their tests on any aspect ofBRCA, we'll end up
having testing performed by mediocre labs; some have actually already been sued for not having detected mutations they should have
seen.r,o

By enforcing a testing monopoly, Myriad argues, they are simply establishing a standard of high quality testing that protects the public from
inferior screening programs. 61
The clever public relations spin Myriad has put on its monopoly
position has been directly challenged by Curie Institute, a not-for-profit
P. Gomer, "Parents Suing over Patenting of Genetic Test" The Chicago Tribune (19
November 2000).
59
Ibid.
60 Institut Curie, Press Release, "Against Myriad Genetics's Monopoly on Tests for Predisposition to Breast and Ovarian Cancer, the Institut Curie is Initiating an Opposition Procedure
with the European Patent Office (12 September 2001 ), online: <http://www.curie.net/
frame.cfm?menu= A&smenu=A&content=actual ites/myriad/ dee laration _ e. htm> (date accessed: 15 November 200 I).
61
C. Malian, "Gene Tests for Cancer Won't Stop: Harris Pledges Help with Battle over U.S.
Patent" The Torollto Star (20 September 2001 ).
58
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cancer research group in Paris, France. In October 2001, the Curie
Institute filed an opposition to Myriad's European BRCAI patent, challenging it on a number of technical grounds. The Curie Institute, having
published data showing the BRACAnalysisa method fails to detect
certain types of mutations in BRCAl, 62 objected to the company's claim
of a monopoly over testing in Europe - an excessively broad scope of
patent right.
Patent holders may operate in the public interest by offering unrestricted access to genetic testing or claim to be operating in the public
interest by restricting testing. What constitutes the 'public interest' and
how it is appropriately balanced against private interests must be examined more closely to determine whether current patent laws should be
changed.

VI. UNDERSTANDING THE NEED FOR PATENT REFORM
1. Deontological Arguments: Human Disease Genes are Not Cell
Phones
Fundamental objections to the patenting of human genetic material
is fueling a rebellion against Myriad's BRCA gene patents that extends
far beyond Ontario. In addition to the Curie Institute's opposition,
testing agencies in Gennany, Britain, and the Netherlands are refusing
to stop testing in favour of sending samples to Myriad's worldwide
testing center in Utah. 63 Dr. Gregory Critchfield, President of Myriad,
argues that European labs cannot continue testing in the face of
Myriad's patent. He has analogized patents on human disease genes to
those for consumer goods by asking, "[i]fl am a researcher that works in
telecom and I want to be able to build my own cell phone, can I steal
from Nokia?" 64 In making such a comment, Dr. Critchfield has funda62 D. Stoppa-Lyonnet et al., "Identification of a Large Rearrangement of the BRCAI Gene
using Colour Bar Code on Combed DNA in an American Breast/ovarian Cancer Family
Previously Studied by Direct Sequencing" (200 l) 38 J. Med. Gen. 388.
63
M. Wadman, "Testing Time for Gene Patent as Europe Rebels" 413, 443 Nature 4 October
2001
64
Quoted in M. Wadman, "Europe's Patent Rebellion" Fortune (October 2001), online:
<http://www.business2.com/articles/mag/print/O, 1643, 17133,FF.html> (date accessed: 8 November 200 l ).

108-DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

mentally misunderstood the nature of the human genome. Genes, especially human disease genes, are not analogous to cell phones. Nor is
access to cell phone technology analogous to access to predictive BRCA
gene testing. Dr. Critchfield seems to have no difficulty viewing human
genes as a commodity that is appropriately held as individual property
and subjected to market forces. Breast cancer susceptibility screening,
however, has a significant public interest and public health component
that is obviously missing from the development of Nokia's newest
gadget. While Dr. Critchfield may endorse the market ethic that has
enveloped the American health care system, 65 such an ideology will not
be warmly embraced in Canada.
At the heart of the growing backlash against Myriad is a principled
objection to the patenting of the human genome, a position expressed by
the French Minister for Research and Technology in a 1991 letter to
Science:
It would be prejudicial.for scientists to adopt a generalized system of
patenting knowledge about the human genome ... [S}uch a development would be ethically unacceptable. A patent should not be granted
for something that is part of our universal heritage. 66

The human genome is fundamentally different from traditional
patent matter such as light bulbs, compact disc players or cell phones,
thereby justifying special treatment under the law. Human biological
material has unique cultural and societal meaning. 67 Genes are inherent
to our personal identity and are common to all humanity. This view was
expressed in UNESCO' s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome
and Human Rights:

65

For a general discussion of the commodification of health care, see: K. Wildes, "More
Questions than Answers: The Commodification of Health Care" (1999), 24 J. Med. Phil. 307;
M. Hanson, "Biotechnology and Commodification within Health Care" (1999), 24 J. Med.
Phil. 267.
66
H. Curi en, "The Human Genome Project and Patents" ( 1991 ), 254 Science 1710.
67 But see M.M. Burgess, "Whither Morality in Genetic Tests?" (200 I) 9:3 Health L. Rev. 3 at
4 [hereinafter "Whither Morality"]. Professor Burgess cautions against grounding social
policy regarding access to genetic testing in the "special nature of the genome" but does not
address the legitimacy of gene patenting. Burgess argues that the centrality of the genome to
human nature, dignity and moral status must not be overestimated and avoiding an instrumental view of the genome is not a persuasive reason to limit access to genetic testing. It does not
necessarily follow, however, that the unique character of the genome (which is not denied by
Burgess) is insufficient to warrant concern over gene patenting.
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A1iicle I: The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all
members of the human family, as well as the recognition of their
inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of
humanity.

Article 4: The human genome in its natural state shall not give rise to
financial gains. 68

In September 2001, UNESCO's International Bioethics Committee

(IBC) recommended on ethical grounds that the human genome should
be excluded from patentability. 69 Similarly, the Human Genome Organization (HUGO) has stated, "the human genome is our common heritage and collective property; genetic information is .. .in the public
domain ... human DNA is not patentable, but belongs to humankind." 70
These statements are evidence of a growing awareness of the difficult
issues at the intersection of genetic research and patent law.
Underlying this broad, principled objection to the patenting of human genes appears to be a cluster of five related arguments. I will
discuss each in tum and critique their relevance to whether intervention
in the current patent system is warranted.
(i) Universal Heritage

The human genome is inherently distinct from patentable subject
matter due to its universal character and status as paii of our natural
heritage. 71 In the sense that disease and health are foundational to our
experience as human beings, disease-associated genes can be seen as
central to our sense of natural heritage.

"UNESCO: Universal Declaration of the Human Genome and Human Rights, UNESCO
Doc. 27V /45" (1998) 23 J. Med. Phil. 334 at 336 [hereinafter "UNESCO Declaration"]. The
UNESCO Universal Declaration was adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in
1997 and endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1998.
69
UNESCO IBC, "Advice of the International Bioethics Committee ofUNESCO (IBC) on the
Patentability of the Human Genome" (14 September 2001), online: <http://www.unesco.org/
ibc/en/genome/ Advice_Patent_HG _ E.html> (date accessed: 16 November 200 I).
70
Human Genome Organization, Ethical Implications of the Human Genome Project: International Issues, cited in Looney, supra note 8.
71 P.A. Lacy, "Gene Patenting: Universal Heritage vs. Reward for Human Effort" (1998), 77
Oregon L. Rev. 783 at 798 [hereinafter "Universal Heritage"].
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The idea that the human genome is part of humanity's universal
heritage is difficult to dispute. What few authors have addressed is why
the unique nature of the genome necessitates the conclusion that it is
incompatible with patent rights. More than an argument in itself, the
"universal heritage" claim lays the foundation for other deontological
objections.
The counter argument to all objections based on the universal,
sacred nature of the genome is a legalistic one. Since it is the "novel,
purified and isolated"72 form of a gene and not the gene in its natural
form that can be patented, it is argued that there is no ownership or
compromising of the 'universal heritage.' William Haseltine, President
of Human Genome Sciences, articulated the distinction in this way:
Trying to patent a human gene is like trying to patent a tree. You can
patent a table that you build from a tree, but you cannot patent the tree
itself. 73

Applying the Myriad situation to this analogy, we should not be
concerned about the patenting of BRCAl and 2, because Myriad has
patented the purified, manipulated form of BRCA 112 (the "table") and
not the natural form of those genes (the "tree"), which is our natural,
universal heritage.
In the case of human disease gene patents, the distinction between
the "tree" and the "table" is purely illusory. With exclusive rights over
all diagnostic and therapeutic applications of the BRCA genes, Myriad
in effect has control over the natural forn1 of the genes. Canadian and
European labs are not using Myriad's technology, testing methods or
data as part of their BRCA tests but arguably have infringed Myriad's
patents. Testing a patient's natural.form of the BRCA genes using any
technique seems to be a patent infringement. Practically speaking,
Myriad is claiming what amounts to patent protection over lmowledge of
the BRCA genes, since it is not only the technology or processes that are
protected but use of the gene sequence. Current patent law makes no
allowance for the nature of human genes or draws a distinction between
the scope of genetic and non-genetic patents. Consequently, the claim
that patents on the purified, isolated form of a human gene have no

72

73

Amgen, supra note 2 at 1206.
Universal Heritage, supra note 71.
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relation to concerns over the universal heritage of the human genome are
unconvmcmg.
(ii) Commodifzcation
Gene patenting may undermine human dignity and our sense of
"humanness" by commodifying genetic material and treating the genome (and therefore people) as property. 74 There are a number of
elements that can be teased out of this assertion. Human dignity and
'humanness' are undermined by gene patenting because it alters our
conception of the genome, which is central to our humanity, into an
object that can be owned. Philosopher David Resnik has distilled part of
this argument into a three step analysis:
1) patenting human genes treats person as property that can be
bought, sold, traded or modified;
2) it is morally wrong to treat persons as property;
3) the practice of human gene patenting is therefore morally
wrong. 75
In reply, Resnik maintains that as long as patents are only allowed on

inventions related to manipulating, analyzing or sequencing genes,
people are not being treated as prope1iy. This type of patenting would be
unproblematic. However, as I have discussed using Myriad as an illustration, patents on human disease genes currently are of such a large
scope so as to, in effect, grant a patent on the natural form of the gene
itself. Personal property law doctrines seem incompatible with a subject
matter that forms part of the evolution of humanity and is key to each of
our personal identities.
As Macklin discusses, undermining our sense of 'humanness' is a
difficult foundation on which to build public policy arguments for
banning human gene patenting. 76 The shifting sand of concepts such as
human nature, humanness and what amounts to dehumanizing practices
are difficult to capture.
74

These arguments are discussed by Macklin, supra note 8 at 132. Macklin addresses the
human dignity, humanness, and commodification arguments separately. I have merged them
as related concepts that are most usefully discussed in concert as they relate to human disease
gene patenting.
75
D. B. Resnik, "The Morality of Human Gene Patents" (1997) 7 Kennedy Institute of Ethics
J. 50 at 54 [hereinafter "Resnik"].
76
Macklin, supra note 8 at 133.
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Concerns about commodification reference a more general idea that
the human genome should not be subjected to the forces of the marketplace or thought of as the subject of ownership rights. Patents serve
primarily an economic function and subject patented material to the
marketplace. Martin Teitel, in his article The Commercialization ofLife,
comments that it is difficult to imagine a greater presumption than an
individual or company asserting exclusive rights over the "fantastically
intricate genetic code that represents the current end point of millions of
years of biological evolution." 77 The universality of the human genome
seems disharmonious with a pure market-driven view of genes as a
commodity.
Critics of this argument would again fall back on the weak plea that
the natural form of a human gene is not patentable. As discussed above,
this reply is unconvincing. Patent holders like Myriad may not be the
only paiiy to blame for commodifying human genes. Our current patent
law regime was a permissive paiiicipant in stretching the originating
concepts of intellectual property rights to their limits. Myriad simply
exploited to their advantage an economically focused system unprepared for the genetic revolution.
(iii) Collective Property

Since the genome is universal, an appropriate concept of 'ownership' is a collective one that is incompatible with individual monopoly
rights. 78 There are two facets to this argument and therefore two types of
counter-arguments to address.
The first aspect of this argument is that the universal nature of the
genome is detenninative of the fact that collective, not individual rights
should exist. This claim is not convincing. While it could be argued the
universal character of the environment and natural resources prohibits
the granting of individual property rights, this philosophy is not widely
accepted in mainstream North American culture. Non-collective ownership and control over land, waterways, airspace and natural resources
are ideas deeply ingrained in much of Canadian culture. Its universality
is not, therefore, the critical element to a claim for a collective interest in
the human genome.
77
78

M. Teitel, "The Commercialization of Life" (1996), I 0 Gene Watch I at 2.
Macklin, supra note 8 at 133.
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The second aspect of the common property argument against human
gene patenting claims that the genome is unpatentable because it is our
common heritage. The word 'common' incorporates the idea of universality discussed above. 79 Arguing that the genome being humanity's
"common heritage" is inconsistent with gene patenting is more convincing than simply its shared nature. Not only is the genome shared, but it is
uniquely fundamental to our existence. In a sense, it is the essence of our
humanity. The genome is what we inherit from generations before us
and what we pass on to generations after us. It evolves as our species
evolves and sets the boundaries of our existence. As stated by HUGO,
the human genome belongs to humankind, although this view is unlikely
to please the biotechnology industry.

(iv) Privacy Rights
As part of the human body, genes arguably attract an expectation of
privacy. Flowing from a sense of collective 'ownership' of the genome,
gene patenting also may violate a collective privacy right. This argument has been succinctly articulated by B. Looney:
The patenting of genes and gene sequences may interfere with privacy
rights in that it permits an interference with a bodily part. Genes are the
building blocks of human life and a part of every cell in the human
body. Moreover, genes are inextricably and intimately related not only
to a person's physical body, but also to a person's intellectual and
emotional constitution. They are thus in a zone of privacy that may be
violated by assignment of gene patent rights to others.
A collective privacy right also may be violated by gene patenting.
Genome research seeks a composite map of humankind's collective
genetic make-up. Critics of gene patenting cite the privacy infringement inherent in assigning ownership interests to an item in which
eve1y individual is a part-owner merely by virtue of being human
[footnotes omitted].8°

Even if we accept the assumptions underlying Looney's analysis, an
invasion of privacy (be it individual or collective) fails to offer a
persuasive justification for banning human gene patenting. Arguably, all
Jn this paper I often use the term "universal heritage" which makes explicit the idea that the
word 'common' encompasses ideas of universality.
80
Looney, supra note 8 at 238.
79
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scientific research using humans that sheds light on some aspect of our
shared experience would constitute an invasion of privacy. Since we are
all susceptible to certain diseases, much of that research could also be
considered a violation of collective privacy rights, yet the value of
scientific research is seen to clearly outweigh the harm of any minimal
privacy violation.
Looney has drawn an analogy between collective rights in the genome and collective rights in the environment. 81 Just as our collective
interest in a safe environment justifies limitations on harmful polluting
activities, limitations on gene patenting are justified by a comparable
concern for a "well-preserved genetic history." 82 It is difficult to analogize pollution and other inherently harmful activities with gene patenting, a seemingly value-neutral legal process. Patenting in and of itself
does not harm the genome and thereby engage privacy rights. To the
extent that patenting may interfere with collective rights to knowledge
or benefits of genetic research, such effects are more appropriately
analyzed as distributive justice issues than invasions of personal or
collective privacy.
(v) Distributive Justice
One version of distributive justice principles 83 would demand that
the benefits of genomic research not be concentrated in the hands of a
patent holder. There are various ways to construct a just and moral
distribution of benefits from genome research. One version, as stated in
the Bilbao Declaration, 84 draws on ideas of the universality of the
human genome:

81

Ibid.
Ibid.
83
Distributive justiee refers to "just distribution in society structured by various moral, legal,
and cultural rules and principles that form the terms of cooperation for that society, that is, the
implicit and explicit terms under which individuals are obligated to cooperate." Distributive
justice principles require a connection between a person's characteristics and the morally
correct distribution of burdens and benefits in society: T.L. Beauchamp & J.F. Childress,
Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 3'd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) at 258
[hereinafter "Beauchamp & Childress"]
84
The Bilbao Declaration is an international statement by scientists and legal experts on the
legal implications of the Human Genome Project. The Bilbao Declaration was adopted during
the May 26, 1993 International Workshop on the Human Genome Project: Legal Aspects.
82
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[N]ational and international rules should be developed, having as their
[objectives] .. .the just distribution to people eve1ywhere ofthe benefits

of the Human Genome Project ·whose product belongs ultimately not
to individual scientists, nor to sponsoring nations but to human beings
in every land: of this generations [sic] and of all generations to come
[emphasis added].8 5

A similar sentiment is expressed in Article 12 of UNESCO's Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights:
a)

Benefits fi·om advances in biology, genetics and medicine, concerning the
human genome, shall be made available to all, with due regard to the

b)

Freedom of research, which is necessary to the progress of knowledge, is
part of the freedom of thought. The applications of research, including
those in biology, genetics and medicine, concerning the human genome,
shall seek to offer relief from suffering and improve the health of individuals and humankind as a whole [emphasis added]. 86

dignity and human rights of each individual.

Both the Bilbao and UNESCO Declarations propose a model of just
benefit distribution that is inconsistent with human gene patent monopolies. It is unjust for our patent regime to allow the 'fruits of genome
research' to be monopolized by a certain segment of society (the affluent) or by developed countries, when all of the world's citizens should
enjoy such benefits. For disease-associated genes, where potential diagnostic and therapeutic applications are in question, the argument is even
stronger that distributive justice principles challenge the morality of a
patent law system that fails to address the distinct character of the human
genome. Benefits that should belong to humankind are at stake. 87
The marketplace conception of "justice as fairness" 88 counters the
suggestion that gene patent monopolies are unfair. Patent holders may
argue that a different model of distributive justice should be applied in

85

BBV Foundation, Bilbao Declaration (1993) at para I 0.
UNESCO Declaration, supra note 68 at 338.
87
B. Healy highlights in "Special Report on Gene Patenting" (1992), 327 New. Eng. J. Med.
665 at 666 the danger that industrial nations holding monopolies on gene patents might sell
end products of those patents back to developing nations at prohibitively high prices. In light
of the universal heritage character of the genome, this would be an unjust distribution of
benefits and burdens.
88
Macklin, supra note 8 at 134.
86
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relation to gene patents. It may be just and proper to distribute reward to
those who expend effort and money to make genome-related discoveries. Beauchamp & Childress discuss the idea of justice as fairness in this
way:
[l]n general, rules and laws are unjust when they make distinctions
between classes of persons that are actually similar in relevant respects, or fail to make distinctions between classes that are actually
different in relevant respects. 89

Arguably, to weaken patent protection over human genes would be
unjust to researchers (and the investors supporting their work, but I will
use the term researcher for simplicity's sake in discussing this argument) in two respects. First, researchers are materially distinct from the
rest of the population who has not spent time and money engaged in
genome research. Refusing patent protection would unfairly 'fail to
draw a distinction between classes that are actually different in relevant
respects.' Second, genetic researchers are similar to researchers in other
fields of investigation. To refuse patent protection for comparable effo11
when patents are available in other areas of scientific endeavour would
unfairly 'draw distinctions between classes of persons that are actually
similar in relevant respects'.
What is clear from aiiiculating these counter arguments is that the
validity of conclusions based on distributive justice ideals is contingent
on our view of what distinctions should legitimately be taken into
account.
(vi) Effort Must be Rewarded

The first reply to the argument that benefits of genetic research
should be available to all of humanity is that researchers have expended
effort in relation to genetic innovations while the rest of the population
has not, so it is fair to award patents as a recognition of that distinction.
The weakness of this argument is it fails to recognize that our patent
system is not designed to reward effmi and investment in research carte
blanche - only the first to complete the final stretch in meeting the
patentability requirements succeeds.

89

Beauchamp & Childress, supra note 83 at 257
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The Curie Institute's opposition to Myriad's European BRCAl
patent, for example, is in paii based on the assertion that an international
public consortium of researchers had completed much of the foundational investigation into BRCA 1. Myriad, they claim, swept in near the
finish line, conducted "routine" final sequencing of the gene and filed
the patent application that granted them, in effect, monopoly rights over
the gene. 90 If patent law drew a distinction between those who expended
effort and resources in conducting research and those that did not, then
the system would not have granted Myriad exclusive rights, but would
have recognized all parties who contributed to the innovation.
Patent law is not simply a meritocratic body of rules, since many
who expend considerable time and money go unrewarded in the end. A
claim that researchers deserve patents because they have made effort
while the rest of humanity has not is an unpersuasive argument for
maintaining the status quo in our system of patent law.
(vii) Discriniination Based on Field of Research is Unfair
The second objection to a universal distribution of benefits from
genome-related research is that it is fundamentally unfair to refuse
patents in genetic research since patents are pennitted in all other similar
fields ofresearch and development. Unquestionably, drawing a distinction between genome-related patents (human disease gene patents specifically) and all other patentable material is drawing a distinction
between genetics and other fields of research, and justifiably so.
It is difficult to imagine another area of research that has internationally been lauded as the "heritage of humanity"91 and an issue that is
"nothing less than the future of humanity." 92 While these statements
may, at first glance, seem unnecessarily dramatic, few in the scientific or
legal communities are downplaying the significance of the Human
Genome Project and the myriad scientific/legal/moral/ethical issues it
raises. Recall that ethicists Beauchamp and Childress stated that it
would be unjust to make distinctions between classes of persons that are
actually similar in relevant respects. 93 The overwhelming public inter9

° Curie Institute Press Release, supra note 60.

UNESCO Declaration, supra note 68.
n Bilbao Declaration, supra note 85.
91
Beauchamp & Childress, supra note 83 at 263.
91
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est dimension to human genome research (specifically human disease
gene research since it explicitly engages public health issues) places it in
a realm that is not analogous to other seemingly similar fields of research. On this basis, it is fair to draw a distinction between patents for
genome-related subject matter and other innovations.
2. Consequentialist Arguments

Patent monopolies in the arena of human disease-related genes are in
their infancy. Companies such as Myriad are just starting to explore the
scope of the legal rights vested in them by our current patent regime. In
the next decade we will be faced with the consequences of the policies
we choose to implement today. In deciding whether patent reform is
necessary, it is informative to address the expected consequences of
allowing monopoly rights over human disease genes.
The consequentialist arguments I will address in this section are of
two types. First, I will discuss the necessity of gene patents for advancement in genetic technologies and the effects of human disease gene
patenting on international collaboration and the dissemination of information within the field. I will argue that many of industry's objections to
patent refmm are unpersuasive and that when balanced against the
public interest, offer no strong reason to maintain the legal status quo,
which favours companies such as Myriad.
Secondly, I will discuss the consequences of a commercial monopoly on the development and delivery of genetic testing. I will argue
that not only are monopolies in this arena per se inappropriate, the
dangers of commercial monopolies offer compelling reasons to refo1m
our current patent policy in relation to human disease-associated genes.
(i) Whether Rigorous Patent Protection is Necessary to Promote
Innovation
The simplistic view of patent law is that the broader patent protection is, the greater the scope of innovation that will occur in society.
Since innovation benefits society generally, the most liberal patent
regime possible should be implemented. This articulation of potential
patent policy is far too simplistic, near-sighted and economically oriented. The value of innovation for its own sake must be balanced against
other legitimate interests and concerns. While a pure version of this
argument is easily overcome, vestiges of this view underlie many other
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arguments in favour of broad patent laws and must be recognized where
it lurks behind other, more innocuous, claims.
The call from the biotechnology industry for greater patent protection is more than a philanthropic gesture towards increasing innovation
in the name of the public good. Any effect of the patent regime on
society's overall ingenuity may simply be a benefit collateral to the
industry's primary objective of increasing profits. 94
The desirability of public as opposed to private involvement in
human genome research, development, and product delivery is a debate
that raises a host of legal, ethical and policy issues that are largely
beyond the scope of this paper. Whether genetic testing should be
permitted at all or if private source testing should be allowed are
engaging questions that are inspiring a rich academic literature. 95 The
reality in Canada today, however, is that private industry is significantly
involved in bringing genetic tests to the public. 96 How private interests,
including patent rights, can best be integrated into the Canadian health
care system is now the key question. To focus the issue even further, the
key question is whether the harmful consequences of a commercial
monopoly, such as that claimed by Myriad over breast cancer susceptibility testing, demands patent reform.
94

E. Richard Gold, in "Biomedical Patents and Ethics: A Canadian Solution" (2000), 45
McGill L.J. 413 at 423 [hereinafter "Biomedical Patents and Ethics"] has gone so far as to
state:
"The argument for greater patent protection should be understood for what
it is: an attempt to maximize profit, not to maximize levels of innovation.
Clearly, a company would prefer to have as large a monopoly as possible.
This gives it ultimate control over how and when to market its product and
the ability to garner monopoly profits. But patent law is not about individual profit maximization; it is about maximizing the overall level of
innovation in society."
95
See especially B. Williams-Jones, "Re-Framing the Discussion: Commercial Genetic Testing in Canada" (1999) 7 Health L.J. 49 [hereinafter "Re-Framing the Discussion"]; J.K.
Frizzley, "Ethical Issues in Breast Cancer Susceptibility Testing" ( 1998) 6:2 Health L. Rev.
14; M.M. Burgess, "Marketing and Fear Mongering" in T. A. Caulfield & B. Williams-Jones,
eds., The Commercialization of Genetic Research: Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues (New
York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, I 999) I 81 [hereinafter [Fear Mongering"];
Whither Morality, supra note 67.
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L. Goldberg & M. Jackson, "The Current Status of Genomic Commercialization in Canada"
(1999) 7:3 Health L. Rev. 17 [hereinafter "Current Status"]; T.A. Caulfield, "The Informed
Gatekeeper?: A Commentary on Genetic Tests, Marketing Pressure and the Role of Primary
Care Physicians" (2001) 9:3 Health L. Rev. 14 at 14,17; Re-Framing the Discussion, supra
note 95 at 50-54.
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Intellectual property rights are a major incentive for industry's investment in the research and development of new drugs, therapies and
diagnostic technologies. Without a guarantee of patent protection and
the accompanying financial rewards, it is argued, private investment in
research would be "seriously compromised" 97 and tomoffow' s greatest
inventions would never be realized. Private funding sources can bear the
immense financial cost to bring research to a commercial product endpoint (from which society at large benefits) but must be rewarded with
the potential for a return on their investment or such research would not
occur.
From the point of view of the biotechnology industry, patent rights
should be strengthened, not weakened or restricted. It has been suggested that to remain competitive in the global economy and to encourage innovation in the biotechnology sector, Canada's patent laws in
relation to biotechnology must be at least consistent with, if not broader
than, the United States. 98 Private sector investment in research increases
when patent protection is robust, 99 and increased investment benefits the
economy and results in increased innovative output. Society, it is argued, benefits from strong patent laws because they encourage investment and innovation. To reform our approach to human gene patents
could have two related effects - decrease investment in biotechnology in
Canada and decrease output from that sector. Canada could lag behind
its global competitors and become an unattractive place for biotechnology investors to call home.
The easy reply to this position is to take the moral "high ground". If
we accept the fundamental ethical reasons (discussed earlier in Part VI)
and the consequentialist arguments (discussed later in Part VI) why
Discussed in E.R. Gold, "Making Room: Reintegrating Basic Research, Health Policy, and
Ethics into Patent Law" in T.A. Caulfield & B. Williams-Jones, eds., The Commercialization
of Genetic Research: Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum
Publishers, 1999) 63 at 64 [hereinafter "Making Room"].
98 CBAC, The lnte1:face of Biotechnology Patents and Competition Law (Background Paper)
by W. Grover (Ottawa: CBAC, 2000), online: Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee
<http://cbac-cccb.ca> (date accessed: 20 October 2001) [hereinafter "Grover report"].
99
An often-quoted illustration is the pharmaceutical industry in Canada. Both Bill C-22 in
1986 and Bill C-91 in 1993 strengthened patent protection for dmgs in Canada by changing
the compulsory licensing provisions of the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4. Following each of
these bills becoming law, research and development expenditures by pharmaceutical companies in Canada increased. For a general discussion, see: Brief Histol}'. supra note 11 at 21-24.
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human disease genes should not be treated like cell phones or fabric
softener sheets under our patent system, then we must defend that
position in the face of economic consequences. It may not be cheap or
profitable to be ethical.
When compulsory licensing was first introduced for food and drugs
in Canada, 100 the public policy justifications concerning access and
availability were seen to outweigh the potential economic ramifications
of departing from the classic monopoly system. Similarly, I would
argue, if human disease gene patenting should be refonned as a matter of
public policy, we must not be terrified of potential economic consequences. Patenting human beings, nuclear weapons and methods of
medical treatment may very well be profitable and foster innovation, but
public policy reasons outweigh the potential rewards such expansions
on our patent law would generate. The key question to be answered is
whether human gene patents, granted to private companies, reach the
threshold of public concern that warrants differential treatment. The
deontological and consequentialist arguments presented in this paper
strongly suggest that change is needed.
Aside from hiding behind a moral "high ground" position, there are
two substantive counter-arguments to the claim that a reformed patent
scheme for human disease-associated genes would slow innovation in
the biotechnology sector. First, it has been hypothesized that patents in
this field may have a deterrent effect on innovation, the so-called "tragedy of the anti-commons." 101 Since a number ofrelated patents exist in
this field, research may be stifled by the potential of overlapping rights
or uncertainty about the scope of pre-existing patents.
A version of this "tragedy" is already unfolding in relation to human
disease gene patenting. A 1999 poll indicated that half of American
laboratory directors who were questioned had stopped working on developing various screening technologies because they knew a patent had
been licensed or was pending in the same research area. 102 Thus, in some
The 1923 Patent Act introduced a compulsory licensing scheme for patented food and
drugs: see Brief Hist01y, supra note 11 at 18.
101
See M.A. Heller & R.S. Eisenberg, "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research" (1998) 280 Science 698.
102
J. Borger, "Rush to Patent Genes is Hampering Medical Research" The Guardian (15
December 1999) online: <http://www.purefood.org/Patent/rushpatent.cfm> (date accessed:
11November2001).
100
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cases patents may have an effect opposite to the intended effect of
promoting research and innovation.
Second, authors such as E. Richard Gold have argued that the
economic incentives granted to biomedical materials are too strong and
that there is little empirical proof that the patent system actually encourages innovation in the biomedical field. Without patents, other market
forces may lead to a similar level of innovation in the biotechnology
sector. 103 More limited patent rights may act as a sufficient economic
incentive for the private sector to undertake biomedical research. This
view runs counter to industry's demands for stronger patent protection.
If public policy concerns are considered, there may be approaches to
human disease-associated gene patents that more effectively balance
public and private interests in genome research.
In the case of human disease genes, there is an additional reason to
believe that an inability to patent human genes would not completely
stifle research or financial incentives. If human genes were considered
non-patentable research tools, the end products (or "true" innovations)
such as genetic testing kits and pharmaceutical innovations would still
be patentable and a potential source of profit. In order to develop
marketable end products, gene sequencing and characterization would
still be done but companies would have no basis under which to claim an
exclusive monopoly over diagnostics and therapeutics more generally in
relation to the gene. Other researchers would be able to design and
administer their own tests without fear of patent infringement litigation.
Competing genetic tests would succeed or fail on their own merits
without a bubble of exclusivity artificially protecting the inventor. In
sum, it is not clear that the level of incentive offered by our current
patent system is necessary to promote innovation in disease-related
genetic research. At the very least, concerns about decreased innovation
do not offer overwhelming arguments against patent reform in this
arena.
(ii) Whether Patents Promote or Inhibit b?formation Sharing &
International Collaboration
Unraveling the mystery of the human genome is an international
venture. Information sharing and collaboration are key to ensuring rapid
103

See Making Room, supra note 97 at 68ff; Biomedical Patents and Ethics, supra note 94 at
para. 26.
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and meaningful advancement of our scientific understanding of human
disease diagnosis and treatment. To the extent that gene patenting
promotes delayed disclosure of research findings 104 and encourages
competitiveness as opposed to collaboration, the underlying goals of
patent law and scientific research are left unfulfilled. Researchers keen
to patent their work may delay public disclosure ofresults until a patent
application is filed on the project. This delay in information sharing is an
impediment to scientific advancement. 105 An opposing view is that
since patent applications require full disclosure, patents offer incentive
to avoid suppressing information. More information becomes pmi of the
public domain as part of the patenting process than would be available if
patents were prohibited. Without the guaranteed protection of patents, it
is argued, innovators would resort to trade secrecy and the advancement
of research would suffer even further than under the umbrella of the
patent system.
A related argument addresses the impact of patenting human genes
on international scientific collaboration efforts. Groups such as the
United Kingdom Medical Research Council argue that patents stifle
international collaboration and have called for an international agreement to govern rights in genomic research. 106 Patenting promotes international competitive research behaviour and reduces research to a 'race
to patent'. A logical counter to this argument is not to deny the stifling
effect of patents in specific circumstances, but to argue that overall,
patents add legitimacy to innovations and foster overall investment and
interest in science. 107 In the long run, the public interest is better served
by allowing rather than prohibiting gene patenting.
104
Macklin, supra note 8 at 134 quotes molecular biologist Jonathan King, "Gene Patents
Retard the Protection of Human Health" (1996) IO GeneWatch 9 at II as holding the view
that:
"[c]ontrary to the claims of the biotech industry, gene patents retard
progress in the biomedical arena, introduce secrecy where openness is
essential, and slow the publication and sharing of important results. This
follows from the fact that once a result is reported publicly, it cannot be
patented. Thus, researchers drawn into the web of the patent process do
not report their results, even informally, until they have poassed through
the expensive patent application and granting process."
105
See Sexton, supra note 22 at I.
106
Reviewed in Looney, supra note 8 at 245.
107
R. Eisenberg, "Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use" (1989) 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017 at 1024-1028.
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How patenting effects information sharing and collaboration is not a
debate specific to human disease gene patenting. All areas of science are
experiencing a collision with patent law and private interests. It is
difficult to assess the impact of patenting on the scientific community
because there is no "patent-free" standard against which to compare our
level of progress. While patenting has changed the dynamic of science,
so has the global nature of our economy and the invention of research
tools and methods beyond our imagination even fifty years ago. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to dissect the impact of one specific variable
-patent law- on our pace of scientific progress. The true impact of gene
patenting on the dissemination of infmmation and collaboration effmis
is unclear and therefore offers no clear direction on whether our patent
law regime requires reform.
(iii) Whether a Commercial Monopoly over Genetic Testing
Services is Desirable
A monopoly over all diagnostics and therapeutic applications of a
gene, such as that being claimed by Myriad in relation to the BRCA
genes, is not in the public interest. Such a monopoly being held by a
commercial interest is even more worrisome. As discussed in Pait V of
this paper, Canada's current legal regime likely operates in favour of
Myriad's broad claim to a testing monopoly. The consequences of
permitting commercial monopolies over genetic testing services are
good reasons to call for patent refo1m.
Three of the most persuasive arguments against maintaining the
status quo are:

(A) the harmful effects of monopolization;
(B) the harmful effects of commercial monopolies in skewing the
focus of genetic research;
(C) limitations on access to services and costs to the public health
care system.
For the sake of clarity, I will discuss each argument using Myriad's
patent and exclusive BRCA testing rights as an illustration of potential
harms.
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(A) Harmjitl Effects ofMonopolization
Many in the medical field argue that genetic testing monopolies are
not in the best interests of patients. Myriad is attempting to dictate what
methods can be used to test for BRCA mutations and may be able to
limit the conditions under which testing can be performed. Jon F. Merz,
an ethicist at the University of Pennsylvania, has expressed a concern
that monopolies allow gene patent holders to dictate the medical standard of care. This power is an unacceptable outcome of patenting and
highlights the fundamental incompatibility of patenting with medical
care. 108
Another concern about single source testing is that refinement and
optimization of testing methods may be hindered by a patent holder such
as Myriad demanding exclusive rights to testing. Clinicians, no longer
allowed to improve diagnostic technologies, will lose the expertise and
skill in testing that will be required of them once Myriad's patent
expires.
Having a patent holder exercise exclusive rights and use a substandard test is not in the public's best interest. Without alternate testing
methods being clinically available, it may be difficult to determine
which tests have superior predictive value. The reliability and accuracy
of services in an industry such as genetic testing, which is not yet subject
to a rigorous regulatory scheme, must be ensured.
France's Curie Institute claims that Myriad's BRACAnalysisa testing method is unreliable. 109 Researchers at the Institute recently published data showing that Myriad's technology fails to detect 10-20% of
all mutations in the BRCA genes. 110 This finding contradicts Myriad's
claims that their aggressive patent enforcement protects the public from
"short-cut" testing methods performed by mediocre labs. 111 Myriad's
claim that their method is the 'gold standard' in testing may be premature. In the face of monopoly rights, however, it may be difficult for
clinical labs to make such determinations.
Monopoly rights over genetic testing also raises concerns about the
use of genetic information. Discriminatory uses of genetic information
Disease Gene Patents, supra note 4 at 327.
Curie fnsitute Press Release, supra note 60.
110
Supra note 62.
111
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108
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and a lack of genetic privacy are two harmful effects that could result
from monopoly rights on testing.
Certain gene mutations occur more frequently in some ethnic or
racial groups. Ashkenazi Jewish populations, for example, are at higher
risk for Canavan disease and hereditary breast cancer than the general
population. 112 Potentially, genetic infmmation (including susceptibility
to cancer) or even the availability of genetic testing could be used in
discriminatory ways. Professor Gold has expressed concern that as a
society we should not leave in a single party's hands "the decision about
whether a patented good is used in such a fashion as to lead to the
effective discrimination of a minority. " 113
Regarding genetic privacy, the Curie Institute objects to the fact that
if Myriad is successful in compelling labs worldwide to send samples to
Utah for analysis, the company will be able to build up an extensive
human genetic data bank. 114 The privacy of patients' genetic inforn1ation has not been ensured.
Concerns about genetic discrimination and misgivings about potential abuses of a genetic databank are valid issues to which there has not
been enough attention brought. As the vast potential of the biotechnology industry is realized, specifically in relation to the human genome,
the proper use of genetic info1mation will be debated in fora much
broader than the patent law arena. It is likely that many of these concerns
will be addressed by mechanisms external to patent law.
Arguments against monopoly rights over genetic testing seem ethically persuasive when grounded in the potential harmful consequences
outlined above. Many of the same arguments, however, could be invoked to argue against allowing monopolies over any medical or pharmaceutical product. It is difficult to justify genetic testing being subject
to a higher set of concerns than life-saving medications, medical equipment or other health-related products. On balance, the concerns over the
harmful effects of monopolies in this area must be taken into account but
do not by themselves strongly compel patent reform.
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"Breast Cancer, the Genetic "Quick Fix" and the Jewish Community" (1997) 7 Health
Matrix 97 at 99.
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Making Room, supra note 97 at 73.
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Curie Institute Press Release, supra note 60.
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(B) Harmful e.flects of commercial monopolies
Compounding the arguments that genetic testing monopolies are
inappropriate per se is an objection to private companies exercising such
monopolies. Commercial interests are profit-driven and not necessarily
committed to acting exclusively in the public interest. An American
biotechnology corporation should not drive Canadian health policy
regarding the availability of or the clinical standards for genetic testing. 11s
Commercial involvement in health research raises another concern.
Public health measures and advances in preventative treatments, which
hold the greatest hope for improving human health, may not be
commercializable. Commercial patent holders who control clinical research and potential applications of a human disease-associated gene
would have no incentive to undertake less profitable types of research.
As in other areas of health research, an appropriate balance must be
achieved between public and private interests.
(C) Restricted Access and Exorbitant Cost to the Health Care
System
The price tag associated with Myriad's BRCA gene testing procedure puts it far beyond the financial resources of most Canadians.
Women in British Columbia, where the health department abandoned its
in-province testing program in response to Myriad's cease and desist
demands, 116 have been left stranded. This restricted access is unjust
because it negatively effects the health of women at high risk for
hereditary breast cancer. If accessing testing is beyond their financial
means, women are unable to make informed decisions regarding preventative interventions or future health management and cancer surveillance. Realistically, more disease-associated genes will be patented in
Canada. If, like British Columbia, provinces concede the legality of the
monopoly rights claimed by patent holders but deny provincial health
plan coverage for the costs, access to many medical services may be
restricted. Such consequences are unacceptable.
In Ontario, there is precedent for BRCA screening being 'medically
necessary' and therefore an insured service for women at high-risk for
115
116

Making Room, supra note 97 at 74; Patents in Genes, supra note 7 at 18.
Discussed supra Part IV.
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hereditary breast cancer. 117 Assuming for a moment that commercial
patent holders' testing monopolies are legally enforceable, the financial
consequences for universal health care are staggering. Provinces would
be compelled to pay the testing price set by market forces or hope that
patent holders would be willing to negotiate lower rates. CBAC has
recognized the potential impact of biotechnology patenting on health
services. A draft recommendation in CBAC's Interim Report states that
further research should be conducted into the effects of biotechnology
patenting on all aspects of health care, including what approaches Canadian policymakers can use to address any harmful effects. 118
Concerns over restricted access to testing and the cost to the health
care system are not issues specific to breast cancer susceptibility testing.
Prostate cancer, late-onset Alzheimer's, heart disease and a host of other
genetic tests may be made available only through single source commercial providers at exorbitant cost unless patent reform is made a priority.

VII. OPTIONS FOR p ATENT REFORM
As illustrated by Myriad's claims over the BRCA genes, Canada's
current patent regime is not equipped to grapple with the unique issues
raised by human disease gene patenting. Based on both deontological
and consequentialist arguments, the status quo policy of granting human
disease gene patents of broad scope is not justifiable. Government
intervention is warranted to protect the public's interest.
Barbara Looney has proposed that an international Human Genome
Trust be established that would hold the human genome in trust for
humanity and grant licenses as seen fit. 119 Arguably, an international
solution would be ideal since social and ethical concerns surrounding
the genome are not merely a national concern. 120 International consensus would be required to determine the appropriate relationship between

Discussed supra, Part IV.
CBAC Interim Report, supra note 46 at 22. CBAC will be gathering input on its interim
recommendations and issuing a final report ofrecommendations to the Government of Canada
by April 30, 2002.
119
Looney, supra note 8 at 268.
120 Biomedical Patents and Ethics, supra note 94 at para. I 0.
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patent law and the human genome - a consensus that does not currently
exist.
While we wait for an international consensus regarding the patenting
of human disease genes to be negotiated, in Canada, there are a number
of options for domestic policy reform. In designing domestic policy, it is
important to be aware of both the practicalities of implementing a
solution unilaterally within our borders and of Canada's international
obligations relating to intellectual property protection. Our domestic
patent policy must be economically and ethically practical in addition to
appropriately balancing public access to health care against the legitimate commercial interests of patent holders. These criteria make critical
assessment of potential policy choices a complex process. I will outline
a number of the options available to the federal government and highlight key factors in favour of and against each potential strategy. A
combination of approaches may be most effective in addressing the
ethical and practical concerns discussed earlier in Part VI that make our
current patent practice unacceptable.
1. Exclude Disease Genes from Patentability

An approach that would address many of the deontological arguments against granting property rights in the genome would be to
exclude human disease-associated genes from patentability altogether.
Exclusion could be accomplished by adding a subject matter exclusion
clause to the Patent Act, or by taking the European approach of incorporating into the Act a morality and "ordre public" clause 121 that would
enable CIPO to refuse patent applications based on ethical grounds.
There are a number of difficulties with the blanket exclusion option.
First, it is difficult to justify a distinction in law between human diseaseassociated genes and other genes without much more extensive ethical
analysis. Exempting only disease-associated genes may not address the
universal heritage or distributive justice arguments against gene patent121

The European Patent Convention (EPC) prohibits the granting of patents on:
... inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to
'ordre public' or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be
deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or
regulation ...
EC, Directive 98144 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the
Legal Protection of Biotec/1110/ogical J11ve11tio11s, [ 1998] O.J.L. 213/13 at 18, art. 6(1 ).
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ing. At the same time, the consequentialist arguments 122 presented in
favour of patent reform do not necessarily justify a blanket prohibition
on human gene patenting. It would be hasty of Canada to unilaterally
ban human gene patents without finiher consultation and study. A
patenting ban would likely have detrimental effects on our burgeoning
biotechnology industry. 123
The second difficulty with an absolute exclusion approach is that it
may not be consistent with Canada's international obligations regarding
intellectual property rights. Both the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs) 124 and NAFTA 125 contain anti-discrimination clauses that guarantee equal patent protection regardless of the field of technology or
where an invention is produced. 126 If Canada were to impose special
standards or exclude human disease-associated genes from the patent
regime, it may be in violation of TRIPs and NAFT A.
Third, patent exclusion simply may not be the best overall solution.
This approach fails to strike an appropriate balance between commercial
and private interests. It would be nai"ve to deny the legitimate interests of
the biotechnology industry in recouping development costs and making
a (modest) profit. Cooperation and compromise are likely the better
approaches than a blanket prohibition on gene patenting.
In addition, it has been argued that attempting to remove biological
materials from the reach of patent law would subject them to greater
commercial pressure than if they were patentable. 127 No one would have
Discussed supra, Part VI.
Grover report, supra note 98 at 8.
124
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the ability nor the incentive to control the use, development or marketing of biological materials, since they would not be the subjects of patent
rights. While this model imagines a market without other regulatory
forces (which does not exist), it is useful to realize that the consequences
of drastic action may not be any more ethical than our cunent situation.
My fomih objection to the subject matter exclusion or public morality clause approach is primarily a pragmatic one. The problems of
drafting an exclusion clause of appropriate scope, 128 and designing
regulation pursuant to the Patent Act to address questions of interpretation and application is a process that could take years and the effectiveness of the outcome is uncertain. Other areas of invention would be
impacted. Introducing an exclusion provision is an overly broad
brushstroke in response to a specific problem.
2. Opposition Procedure
In October 2001, the Curie Institute in Paris launched an opposition
procedure against Myriad's European patent on the BRCAl gene, challenging the validity of the patent on several grounds. Such an opposition
mechanism is not presently available in Canada.
Under the Patent Act, issued patents are presumed valid until challenged, 129 which usually occurs in the context of infringement litigation.
The courts determine patent validity based on the rights of a patent
holder and the conduct of a potential infringer. There is no room for the
public interest or third party objections. In contrast, Europe's legislation
incorporates a formal opposition procedure. Third parties can challenge
the validity or scope of patents within nine months of them being issued.
This mechanism is currently being used by Paris' Curie Institute to
challenge Myriad's European patent over BRCAl and the diagnostics
associated with the gene. 130
128
It is not clear that without explicit guidance from Parliament that a public order exclusion
clause would apply to gene sequences: Patenti11g o.f Higher Life Forms, supra note 48 at 17.
Europe's public order and morality clause has only successfully been invoked to withhold
patents on a hairless mouse used to test hair growth products and an invention involving the
cloning of a fused human and pig cell. The EPC decided that patenting the "Harvard
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Pate11t Act, supra note 12,.
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Both the National Biotechnology Advisory Committee 131 and the
Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 132 have recommended to
the federal government that Canadian patent law be amended to include
a formal opposition procedure. Third parties could challenge CIPO 's
acceptance of patent applications on grounds of invalidity or excessive
breadth without the expense of a lawsuit. CIPO would be able to
reconsider its decisions in light of third-party arguments and perhaps
develop policies regarding if and when patents could be challenged on
ethical grounds.
While I agree that an opposition process would benefit the administration of the Canadian patent system, this approach in isolation will not
directly address concerns about commercial genetic testing monopolies.
Challenges to the scope or validity of Myriad's BRCA gene patents
based on our current patent law would likely be decided in Myriad's
favour. More direct reform is required.
3. Abuse of Patent Provisions
The Patent Act historically included provisions for abuse-based
compulsory licenses and government appropriation of patent rights in
national emergencies. Reinvigorating these provisions is not consistent
with Canada's international obligations and would not effectively address the concern over the patenting of human disease-associated genes.
The "abuse of patent provisions" of the Patent Act 133 provided a remedy
against monopolistic misuses of patent rights. If a patent holder failed to
meet commercial demand for the patented material within three years of
the patent being issued, a compulsory license could be granted to a third
party or the patent could be revoked. These provisions were deleted in
1993 as part of Canada's commitment to NAFTA.
Attempting to reinvigorate abuse-based compulsory licenses is not a
viable solution to the problem at hand. Apaii from being in violation of
NAFTA, it is questionable whether Myriad's conduct falls within the
interpretation of"abuse of patent". Myriad has made their testing avail-

131 Industry Canada, Leading in the Next Millennium, Sixth Report, (Ottawa: National Biotechnology Advisory Committee, 1998) at 50-54.
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CBAC's Interim Report, supra note 46 at 25.
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Patent Act, supra note 12 at s. 65-66 as rep. by 1993 NAFTA Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, S.C. 1993, c.44.
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able in Canada and is able to meet commercial demand. In addition, such
an approach would undermine the certainty demanded by the biotechnology industry about the meaning of their intellectual property rights.
Waiting to determine whether a company's conduct will fall within the
scope of 'abusing' their patent and then issuing compulsory licenses is
an indirect method of addressing an issue that demands a direct approach.
4. Compulsory Licensing
While we should provide financial incentive to encourage innovation and reward effort in genetic research, we must take an approach that
properly takes into account the public interest in access to services.
Instituting a system of compulsory licensing for human disease-associated gene patents would help recalibrate the balance between the public
and private interests in this arena.
The idea of compulsory licensing for research tools such as cell line
and genes has garnered widespread support in the literature. 134 Companies such as Myriad would be unable to maintain a monopoly over
genetic testing or the development of new technologies. Third parties,
including provincial health authorities, would pay royalty fees to
Myriad in exchange for non-exclusive licenses to do what would otherwise constitute patent infringement. This approach strikes an appropriate policy balance. Myriad still receives an advantage from holding the
patent it receives reasonable royalty fees, but is unable to restrict
access to testing or future diagnostic applications of the BRCA genes.
Immediately implementing a compulsory licensing scheme would
arguably violate Canada's international patent treaty obligations. The
TRIPs Agreement seriously restricts the conditions under which compulsory licensing may be used. Exceptions to the exclusive patent rights
are permissible if they
... do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
patent owner, taking into account the legitimate interests of third
parties. 135

134 Disease Gene Patents, supra note 4 at 325; Making Room, supra note 97 at 72; Patenting
Higher Life Forms, supra note 48 at 17-18.
135 TRIPs, supra note 124, art. 30-31.
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Whether legislating compulsory licences for human disease-associated genes compromises the "legitimate interests" of patent holders such
as Myriad is a matter of interpretation and debate.
The WTO recently adopted a Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health 136 clarifying that member nations "have the right to
grant compulsory licences and have the freedom to determine the
grounds upon which such licences are granted." 137 Although this TRIPS
Declaration was adopted in reference to compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals, it is recognition at the international level that patent rights
are not absolute in the face of public health concerns.
Compulsory licensing solves the problem of restricted access to
genetic testing in a way that would not bankrupt the public health care
system and avoids the harmful effects of commercial monopolies. While
we await an international consensus on the application of patent law to
the human genome, implementing a system of compulsory licensing
strikes a workable balance between various competing interests.

VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

The conflict between Myriad and provincial health ministries across
the country, against a backdrop of financial restraint in the health care
system, has brought the issue of human gene patenting to the forefront of
public attention. The Myriad situation, combined with the release of
CBAC's Interim Report on patenting and the Supreme Comi of Canada
granting leave to decide the ability of researchers to patent a genetically
engineered "Harvard oncomouse" have made biotechnology patents the
subject of heated debate.
Myriad's aggressive posturing to enforce its patents worldwide has
raised not only the question of what the enforceable scope of human
disease-associated genes should be, but whether such genes should be
patented at all. The Canadian Intellectual Prope1iy Office has offered no

136 WTO, Declaration on !he TRIPS Agreemenl and Public Health, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(O I)/
DEC/2, online: WTO <http://www-chil.wto-ministerial.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
minOl_e/ mindecl_trips_e.htm> (date accessed: 23 November 2001) [hereinafter "TRIPS
Declaration"].
137 TRIPS Declaration, supra note 136 at art. 5(b).
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policy guidance in relation to human disease gene patenting. Our current
patent system overprotects private monopolies at the expense of the
public interest. The unique character of the genome and distributive
justice principles demand that genes be treated differently than other
patentable material. The consequences of allowing commercial monopolies over genetic testing also offer strong reasons to recalibrate the
balance between the public and private interest in relation to human
disease-associated gene patenting.
While I have argued that patent reform is crucial, much more public
consultation and debate must take place before it will be clear what
shape such reform should take. Approaches taken by other countries
may not be appropriate in a Canadian setting. Compulsory licensing of
gene patents and establishing a patent opposition procedure hold great
potential as policy options that can be implemented in Canada while we
await an international consensus on the relationship between genes and
patent law.

